A simple account of practical reasons and some of its rivals

Abstract This paper compares my simple account of practical reasons and rationality with the more complex accounts of Mark Schroeder and Josh Gert. On my Humean account, all reasons derive from desires, indicating ways to satisfy them. Stronger or more central desires generate stronger reasons (proportionalism). Rational agents are required to act on the strongest reasons they are aware of. But only agents who are morally (aesthetically, legally, etc.) minded have moral reasons or reasons in particular domains they care about. Irrationality consists in likely self-defeat: defeating more central desires by satisfying more peripheral ones that oppose them or acting in ignorance of what it will be like to satisfy a desire. The aim of practical reason is the satisfaction of prioritized desires over time. Schroeder’s more complex account grants more reasons than mine, including second-level reasons to assign weights to first-level reasons. He distinguishes agent neutral from agent relative reasons, all agents sharing agent neutral moral reasons. He denies proportionalism. Gert’s more complex account distinguishes justifying from requiring normative strength of reasons and holds that altruistic reasons are always rationally justifying but never requiring. I contrast my simpler account on all these grounds.