Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States
Abstract This paper examines paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the US general population. Participants decide whether to intervene when a stakeholder is about to make a choice misaligned with the stakeholder’s own preferences. Willingness to intervene depends on which intervention is available: only a minority implements a hard intervention, which restricts the stakeholder’s choice set, while a majority implements a soft intervention that provides information without restricting choice. A substantial share of participants does not defer to the stakeholder’s stated preferences when evaluating welfare. Our framework estimates that about half are welfarists and a third libertarian paternalists.
Authors
- Bertil Tungodden (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4182-8491)
- Alexander W. Cappelen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3489-7085)
- Henning Hermes (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9339-4779)
- Marit Skivenes (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5326-6692)
- Björn Bartling (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9496-266X)
Institutions
- Ifo Institute for Economic Research (DE)
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of Bergen (NO)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Norwegian School of Economics (NO)
Publication Details
- Journal
- The Economic Journal
- Published
- 2026-10-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag136
- Primary Topic
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00