Does David Benatar’s asymmetry between the absence of pain and the absence of pleasure successfully establish that coming into existence is always a harm?

David Benatar’s asymmetry argument holds that absent pain is good even without a beneficiary, whereas absent pleasure is not bad without someone deprived. This paper asks whether his defenses justify that differential treatment. Building on objections by Bradley and Harman, I examine Benatar’s potential-interests appeal, the Sick-and-Healthy analogy, and his explicit formulation of a suppressed premise. I argue that these direct defenses restate the disputed asymmetry where an independent justification is needed. I then distinguish this charge from an objection to explanatory superiority: the four ordinary moral judgments Benatar invokes may independently support his account, but also admit rival explanations. Their acceptance alone therefore does not establish that his asymmetry is the best explanation. The conclusion concerns the adequacy of the defenses examined, rather than the argument’s formal validity or the truth of anti-natalism.