Fix the broken mirror: using compensation and punishment to repair political trust after local government failures in responding to natural disasters

When a natural disaster strikes and the local government fails to respond effectively, shortcomings in emergency management can lead to a decline in political trust, threatening social cohesion and governance stability. Repairing political trust after emergency response failure is essential for effective disaster management. Drawing on the theory of the social-equilibrium mechanism, we conducted three experiments, demonstrating how governments can restore political trust by employing compensation and punishment behavioural strategies. Our findings reveal that both strategies are effective in repairing trust following local government failures, whether the failure stems from competence-based trust violation or integrity-based trust violation. However, when the failure is a competence-based trust violation, compensation shows a stronger effect than punishment. This research contributes new insights into the trust repair during natural disasters. It further suggests that relevant government departments should closely monitor changes in political trust after local governmental failures in natural disasters and implement diverse, context-sensitive strategies to rebuild and maintain it.