Market Dominance and Competitive Effects of Online Travel Platforms: A Case Study of Ctrip/Trip.com Group in China

The rapid expansion of China’s digital economy has made online travel agencies (OTAs) an important intermediary between consumers and suppliers of accommodation, transport and tourism services. At the same time, platform concentration, network effects and contractual restrictions can create substantial market power. This study examines Ctrip and its parent, Trip.com Group, as a case through which to evaluate the formation and competitive effects of platform dominance. The analysis combines publicly available industry and corporate data with a June 2026 consumer questionnaire. It also incorporates a factual update based on the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) decision of July 2026. The revised analysis finds strong evidence that Trip.com Group has substantial market power, particularly in online hotel-booking platform services, but it avoids treating broad OTA gross merchandise value (GMV) shares as a legally sufficient measure of dominance. The platform’s scale can generate efficiencies through matching, standardisation, service quality and investment in digital infrastructure; however, dominance may also facilitate exclusionary contracting and restrictions on hotel pricing. The consumer survey suggests high brand salience and potential switching behaviour, but its non-probability sample and several instrument inconsistencies prevent causal or population-level inference. Overall, the evidence supports a balanced view: platform scale can improve coordination and consumer convenience, while competition policy remains necessary where contractual or algorithmic mechanisms restrict merchant autonomy or foreclose rivals.