Financing of the International Criminal Court in Situations Referred by the United Nations Security Council: Legal Limits of Cost Allocation

The article examines the legal regime governing the financing of the International Criminal Court in situations referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council. It focuses on the relationship between Article 115(b) of the Rome Statute and the financial clauses of Security Council Resolutions 1593 (2005) on Darfur and 1970 (2011) on Libya. The purpose of the study is to determine the legal significance of those clauses and to distinguish the financial consequences of a referral from its jurisdictional effects. Using formal legal and systemic methods, the article analyses the Rome Statute, the Charter of the United Nations, the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, and the ICC case law in The Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. It is argued that Article 115(b) establishes a possible source of financing but does not impose an unconditional obligation on the United Nations to fund ICC activities arising from every Security Council referral. Consequently, financial clauses in referral resolutions do not affect the Court's jurisdiction. At the same time, the practice of shifting the financial burden to States Parties creates an institutional imbalance. Future referral resolutions should not exclude in advance the possibility of United Nations funding, leaving the matter to the General Assembly under Article 115(b).