Spatio-Temporal Provenance Guard: Detecting Privilege Escalation Attacks That Exploit Spatio-Temporal Data Loss in Multi-Agent MCP Environments
Multi-agent systems using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can lose provenance across storage and session boundaries. This spatio-temporal data loss enables an adversary on the ingestion path to distribute an outbound-transfer directive across incomplete records for a privileged agent to assemble and execute. We propose Spatio-Temporal Provenance Guard (STPG), a gateway defense that persists connector provenance, regroups records by source lineage, and authorizes an external routing call only when a trusted directive is witnessed to target that destination and passes a deterministic structural check. Comparisons use evidence adapters on a common kernel, not published defenses. On a Google Cloud testbed with Gemini agents, STPG blocked all 648 attacks and passed 69 of 71 approved transfers. It matched all specified decisions on a policy challenge set and 190/260 on a frozen set from a second model family. Requiring two witness models to agree reduced false authorizations on descriptive notices from 53 to 25 of 150. On a second held-out set generated after all settings were frozen, conformance was 215/260, rising to 229/260 with witness agreement and an extended resolver. Limits remain in reference resolution, descriptive notices, and trusted rewrites, so the results support bounded, destination-level enforcement on synthetic data.
Authors
- Deuk-Hun Kim (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3740-5568)
- Jin Kwak (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6931-2705)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Applied Sciences
- Published
- 2026-11-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/app162211449
- Primary Topic
- Access Control and Trust
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Research Foundation of Korea