Advertising-Structure Selection and Information-Disclosure Decisions in a New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under Driving-Range Information Asymmetry

The rapid growth of the new energy vehicle (NEV) market has heightened consumer attention to driving range, while information asymmetry concerning real-world driving performance complicates manufacturers’ information-disclosure decisions. This study examines how an NEV manufacturer selects an advertising structure and determines whether to disclose driving-range information within a two-echelon supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a dealer. We develop a game-theoretic model that incorporates manufacturer advertising, cooperative advertising, targeted-advertising efficiency, information-disclosure costs, and consumer trust in the absence of disclosure. We compare equilibrium outcomes across advertising structures to assess how advertising decisions interact with voluntary information disclosure and influence the performance of supply-chain members. The principal findings are as follows: (1) The manufacturer discloses the true driving range only when the realized range exceeds a critical threshold. Furthermore, neither advertising structure is universally optimal; the manufacturer’s preferred structure depends on advertising effectiveness and the channel’s demand-conversion capability. (2) Higher disclosure costs and greater consumer trust under non-disclosure raise the disclosure threshold, whereas greater advertising effectiveness can lower it. Nevertheless, advertising does not invariably strengthen disclosure incentives, as its effect depends on whether the advertising-related benefits of disclosure outweigh the associated costs. (3) The advertising and disclosure strategy that maximizes manufacturer profit does not necessarily benefit dealers and consumers simultaneously. Although cooperative advertising may increase manufacturer profitability, its effects on dealer outcomes and consumer welfare depend on advertising efficiency and demand-conversion effects.