Statutory Devolution Without Perceived Change: Korean Public Officialsʼ Views of Central Intervention, 2010–2022

ABSTRACT South Koreaʼs local‐government reform has not been matched by evidence on how the officials administering intergovernmental relations judge the centreʼs involvement. Using five waves (2010–2022) of a national survey of Korean public officials, we measure whether officials consider central intervention in local affairs excessive. An unadjusted model suggests that judgement hardened; the rise is an artefact of changing sample composition. Standardised to the 2010 composition, an equivalence test bounds the net 2010–2022 change inside a tenth of a scale point, but not 2019–2022, the window nearest the reform. Over the same years Koreaʼs statutory record shows its largest devolution in three decades while its published fiscal ratios ended lower than they began: three records, three answers. A large positional gap persists in every wave, subnational officials judging intervention excessive far more readily than central officials, though a repeated cross‐section cannot separate what officials encounter from what they expect.