Fiqh Jināyah as an Epistemic Break from the Lex Favor Reo Principle in Modern Criminal Law

The principle of ‘Lex Favor Reo’ has long been upheld as an expression of humanism in modern criminal law, as it enables the accused to secure the most favourable provisions. However, underlying this legitimacy lies a fundamental issue: when legality is positioned as the source of the legitimacy of criminal punishment, legal certainty is made the primary focus of legal reasoning, and the benefit to the accused is transformed into a parameter for the correction of justice. Such a paradigm risks centring the orientation of justice on the protection of the perpetrator whilst reducing attention to the suffering of victims and the public interest. This study aims to analyse the epistemology of the lex favor reo principle and to examine fiqh jināyah as an epistemic break from the epistemological foundations that gave rise to and justified it. This study is a normative legal study employing a doctrinal-philosophical, conceptual, legal-philosophical and comparative law approach, with primary data sources comprising turāth literature on jināyah and authoritative positive legal texts, collected through a literature review and analysed via legal reasoning and philosophical interpretation. The results of the study indicate that fiqh jināyah rejects a defendant-centred logic of justice and grounds the legitimacy of criminal punishment in al-'adālah, al-maṣlaḥah, maqāṣid al-syarī'ah, and moral accountability for mafsadah. This study expands the discourse on the legitimacy of criminal sanctions, substantive justice, and the orientation of criminal law towards the public good.