FROM CRISIS RESPONSE TO ROUTINE GOVERNANCE: THE UNEVEN INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CHINA–PAKISTAN LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION

China and Pakistan have built a dense legal framework for law enforcement cooperation, yet much of the cooperation it supports has been assembled in the aftermath of attacks on Chinese nationals. This article asks why formal commitments have produced so little routine practice and why institutionalization varies so widely across issue areas. Drawing on a legal reading of treaties and domestic law, an event–response chronology of attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan (2004–2026), and a content analysis of ten joint statements (2013–2026), the article finds that the framework is high in obligation, moderate in precision, and low in delegation: consultative channels exist, but no joint body holds operational authority. Attacks have changed what the two governments commit to, but cumulatively rather than incident by incident; scheduled diplomacy has largely set the timing of new commitments, and Pakistan’s own investment in protective forces has supplied an anticipatory track. Cooperation has institutionalized fastest where sovereignty costs are low and slowest where it would require foreign security personnel, cross-border evidence, or transfers of data. The China-Pakistan Security Partnership, announced in May 2026 after nineteen months without a lethal attack, suggests a possible shift from crisis-driven to agenda-driven institutionalization. A comparison with the Mekong River joint patrols indicates that routine governance in Pakistan is more likely to rest on standing coordination and host-state capacity, in keeping with cooperation premised on respect for sovereignty, than on joint policing.