Competing Diffusions in a Social Network
We develop a model of competing diffusions of goods on a social network. There are two types of goods and individuals: mass-market and niche-market. There is a unique stable steady state, and the adoption of a mass-market good is greater than its population share. Greater connectivity and homophily will concurrently increase the prevalence of niche-market goods. If there is a strategic agent who wants to promote a niche good, she will invest more in influencing activities than one promoting mass-market goods. When individuals choose their degree of homophily, niche-market individuals exhibit greater homophily than mass-market ones. (JEL D83, D85, L86, Z13)
Authors
- Yves Zénou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6516-0812)
- Philip Ushchev (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8516-3129)
- Christian Matthew Leister (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2324-218X)
- Arthur Campbell (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5444-2125)
Institutions
- Center for Economic and Policy Research (US)
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Monash University (AU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- American Economic Journal Microeconomics
- Published
- 2026-10-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240293
- Primary Topic
- Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00