Confession, Testimony, and Communal Judgment in Theravāda Buddhist Monastic Discipline: An Epistemological Study of the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha

This article examines how disciplinary knowledge is established, challenged, and collectively evaluated within the Theravāda Buddhist Vinaya, focusing on the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha and its procedural setting. Rather than treating monastic discipline exclusively as a catalogue of prohibitions, it interprets confession, testimony, and communal judgment as distinct yet interconnected means of assessing conduct. Through qualitative textual and philosophical analysis of the Pāli Vinaya, the article distinguishes the epistemic position of a monk acknowledging an offense from that of an accuser reporting another monk’s conduct and from that of the Saṅgha resolving a formal disciplinary matter. The argument is that the Vinaya does not reduce responsibility to inward intention or outward action alone: judgments also depend on what participants knew, perceived, admitted, disputed, and could establish through recognized procedures. The seven methods for settling legal questions (adhikaraṇa-samatha) are considered as an institutional framework for handling uncertainty and conflict, rather than as a uniform set of evidentiary rules. This reading foregrounds both the virtues and vices of monastic epistemic practice: authentic self-disclosure facilitates moral restoration, while procedural protections are designed to constrain unsubstantiated accusations and to sustain communal legitimacy. The article contributes to Buddhist religious philosophy by showing how moral integrity and epistemic accountability are mutually implicated in the maintenance of the monastic community.