The Problem of Universals Revisited

This work contributes to the growing body of scholarship on Margaret Macdonald by advancing an interpretation of her early work on pragmatism, communication, and generality. I connect her pragmatist theory of universals to the problem of universals in analytic philosophy by recovering her encounter with A. J. Ayer at the Aristotelian Society in 1933. I argue that Macdonald was not interested in the theory of universals as a problem for metaphysics, but rather, as offering a plausible solution to a more pressing issue concerning the problem of solipsism in communication. After presenting Ayer’s position as a response to Russell and Ramsey on universals, I examine Macdonald’s criticisms of Ayer by setting them against the backdrop of her doctoral work on C. S. Peirce. While Ayer had difficulty accounting for the role universals play in our communicative practices, Macdonald thought that difficulty overcome by turning to Peirce on universals and reality.