Divine command theory and the moral virtue of non-believers

Abstract I argue that even if divine command theorists can ascribe obligations to non-believers, they cannot ascribe full moral virtue to non-believers, because non-believers do not act for all of the right reasons even when they do the right thing. I focus on the Platonic version of divine command theory proposed by Robert Adams and leverage crucial points from another Platonic moral theorist, Iris Murdoch, to emphasize the importance of one’s aspirational orientations for proper moral motivation. I distinguish an approach to the moral life that is grounded in a responsive aspiration towards a transcendent Good from one that is conditioned to some degree by a comparatively rigid alternative that I, following Adams, describe as moral idolatry. I appeal to this distinction to explain what is lacking in the moral motivation of the non-believer as an improper-aspirer, and thereby define a moral limitation that could apply in principle to avowed believers as well. I ultimately leave open whether or not this argument constitutes an objection to divine command theory, and hope primarily to stress the broad importance of clarifying the roles that central concepts in moral psychology (such as virtue and motivation) play in the structure of metaethical theories.