Regulatory Inflation and the Constitutional Limits of Delegated Authority: Repositioning Presidential Accountability within the Indonesian Legal and Regulatory Framework

This article examines regulatory inflation—a pathological condition of the legal system marked by a disproportionate increase in the volume of statutory regulations issued by the executive relative to the state's capacity for implementation, democratic oversight, and judicial enforcement. Since the enactment of Indonesia's Job Creation Law (omnibus law), the formation of Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) and Presidential Regulations (Peraturan Presiden/ Perpres) has accelerated dramatically, raising fundamental constitutional questions about the limits of legislative delegation to the President and the responsibilities that should accompany it. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, historical, and comparative approaches, this article arrives at three findings. First, Article 5(2) of the 1945 Constitution contains three inherent constitutional limits—material, formal, and teleological—that have been disregarded in practice. Second, parliamentary oversight by the House of Representatives (DPR) and judicial review by the Supreme Court have proven ineffective in keeping pace with regulatory inflation. Third, adapting the nondelegation doctrine and the major questions doctrine from comparative legal traditions offers a normative framework for reconstructing presidential responsibility. This article contributes two new concepts: regulatory inflation as an analytical framework, and presidential regulatory accountability as a three-layered construct of responsibility. These findings are expected to enrich constitutional law discourse on executive rule-making and inform efforts toward more accountable, constitutionally grounded regulatory governance.