Hierarchical Adaptability: US Mediation in the Israel‐Hamas War

Abstract In October 2025, after repeated failures to end the war between Israel and Hamas, US‐led talks produced a ceasefire, a framework for the return of all hostages to Israel, and the promise of a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. This article examines how the agreement was produced under such conditions. It argues that powerful mediators can forge deals through a hierarchical structure that organizes actors with different forms of access to, and leverage over, the combatants. In the case of the Gaza accord, the United States assumed the dominant role, using its close relationship with Israel while coordinating Egypt and Qatar as specialized intermediaries with influence over Hamas. This structure allowed military, political, and diplomatic pressure to operate while preserving channels for negotiation. The study traces the negotiations across successive phases of the Gaza war, examining how the roles of the key actors and the forms of leverage they exercised changed as the process alternated through repeated cycles of breakthroughs and breakdowns. The findings show that dominant powers can employ hierarchical adaptability to build agreements incrementally even in the midst of violent conflict.