On the Efficacy of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Metaphysics of Science

This paper examines the role of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the metaphysics of science, a field concerned with understanding the fundamental nature of re ality through engagement with scientific theories and models. While IBE is commonly used to justify belief in scientific theories, its application in metaphysics is debated. Some philosophers, like Armstrong, Ellis, and Swoyer, argue that IBE can also legitimize metaphysical commitments due to their explanatory power. However, critics like Saatsi challenge this par allel, questioning the reliability of IBE even within science, given its mixed historical record. To address this debate, the paper draws on a distinction proposed by Azar and Sardi between two senses of IBE. The first, creative sense—akin to abduction—involves generating novel ex planatory hypotheses and is considered valuable for metaphysical inquiry when understood as an exploration of possibilities informed by science. The second, selective sense—choosing the best explanation among known alternatives—faces significant challenges in metaphysi cal contexts, as its truth-conduciveness has been questioned by several authors (Saatsi 2017, Allzén 2023, Ritchie 2022) due to the absence of the empirical feedback mechanisms that support its reliability in science. We argue that, regardless of how the debate over the epis temic status of selective IBE in metaphysics is ultimately resolved, a moderately naturalized metaphysics of science can benefit from abduction while retaining its explanationist commitment.