What Transfers From Wartime Kyiv? A Framework for Assessing Municipal Resilience Practices for Critical Infrastructure Operators in the United States

ABSTRACT Practices developed under war are increasingly offered as lessons for critical infrastructure operators in peacetime, yet they are rarely examined for what made them work. This article analyzes 14 decisions taken between 2022 and 2024 by the municipal enterprise responsible for Kyiv's city network, cybersecurity and digital services, and asks which of them transfer to municipal and utility operators in the United States. Drawing on the policy transfer literature, it develops a framework that separates each practice from the conditions that enabled it: emergency authority, public tolerance of disruption, procurement speed, and structural assets that a given city may or may not have. Each decision is classified as transferable as is, transferable with modification, or not transferable. Three of the 14 transfer as is, nine transfer only with modification, and two do not transfer. The main finding is that the practices themselves are rarely the obstacle. What does not travel are the enablers, which war supplied on demand and which a city in peacetime must arrange in advance: pre‐delegated decision authority, standing contracts and pre‐identified sites, and data‐sharing agreements with utilities. Because recent federal policy places more responsibility for preparedness on state and local governments, these arrangements are largely within the reach of city governments themselves.