‘Forced’ Opportunism: Purchasing for the Lowest Price in Slovakia
Public procurement accounts for a significant part of global public expenditure. Procurement legislation usually allows authorities to choose the lowest bid or the most economically advantageous offer. Many argue that the lowest price is suitable only when all contract parameters are precisely specified, whereas European procurement directives favor complex criteria. However, Slovakia and some other European countries still rely heavily on the lowest price even for complex contracts. This article explores why Slovak authorities resist multicriteria evaluation. Bureaucracy theory highlights bureaucrats’ risk-averse behavior, driven by a desire to reduce personal and institutional risk. This opportunistic behavior seems to be a critical factor behind Slovakia’s continued use of lowest-price selection, contrasting with the dominant Western EU practices. Understanding these dynamics reveals barriers to more strategic procurement in Slovakia.
Authors
- Martina Hrušková (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4153-4178)
- Vladimír Šagát (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7467-5112)
- Juraj Nemec (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5881-7422)
- Markéta Páleníková
Institutions
- Charles University (CZ)
- Masaryk University (CZ)
- Economie Publique (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences
- Published
- 2026-10-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.24193/tras.79e.7
- Primary Topic
- Public Procurement and Policy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00