Cyber-Resilient Dynamic EV Hosting Capacity Control Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Systems

Dynamic hosting capacity control lets electric vehicle (EV) charging stations use the voltage headroom of distribution feeders. Because charging power is set from voltage measurements, a false data injection attack (FDIA) that inflates the reported voltage makes the controller over-allocate power and drives the real voltage below its limit. This paper models the closed loop of measurement, estimation, control and feeder for a 0.6 MW station on the IEEE 33-bus system and proposes a physics-informed defense: a consistency test between the controller’s voltage and a reconstruction built only from protected substation measurements, the station’s revenue meter and load forecasts. For attacks independent of the measurement noise, its detection probability depends only on the injected shift. With the chi-square bad-data detector at a 1% false-alarm rate, it detects 70–95% of stealthy 0.0075 p.u. attacks, against 34–66% for residual-based detectors, and over 30 simulated days cuts daily under-voltage time from about 180 min to 2–8 min for injections of 0.01 p.u. or more. A supervised neural classifier matches it only on attacks it was trained on and is fully evaded by a model-aware attacker. An adaptive safety margin counters detector-aware attackers for 5.5–7.2% of EV energy. Model bias must be removed by offset re-estimation; noisier protected meters reduce detection power.