TOWARDS A STRUCTURED DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION

Thirty years after the international anti-corruption convergence of 1996, general definitions of corruption continue to exhibit limitations in relation to the knowledge accumulated by international organisations themselves concerning its systemic, macroeconomic and institutional dimensions. This article examines seven limitations of existing definitions and analyses the contributions of the Venice Commission, particularly compliance with the law and the prevention of abuse of power, alongside the inconsistencies between the harms recognised and their treatment under Directive (EU) 2026/1021. The analysis relates these shortcomings to the criminalisation gap and the normative, compliance and implementation gaps examined in previous articles in the series. On this basis, the article proposes a structured definition of corruption involving public authorities and officials, grounded in the abuse of power or functions—including the use of an institutional position outside assigned functions—or non-compliance with the law, through acts or omissions. The breadth of this definition is deliberate: it does not require benefits, harms or thresholds of seriousness, and distinguishes the conceptual identification of corruption from its subsequent legal treatment, including criminalisation. The proposal seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of public corruption and to overcoming the shortcomings of the instruments designed to combat it.