Policy Responses of Small and Middle Powers Under Asymmetric Economic Coercion: ASEAN 's Responses to the Trump Administration's Reciprocal Tariffs

ABSTRACT Existing studies on asymmetric economic competition and coercion have largely portrayed small and middle powers as passive actors that either accommodate or adapt to pressure imposed by major powers. Drawing on the responses of ASEAN member states to the Trump administration's reciprocal tariff policy, this article argues that such a perspective underestimates the strategic agency of smaller states. Rather than simply acquiescing to or resisting US economic coercion, ASEAN countries adopted a range of proactive policy responses aimed at mitigating economic costs while preserving strategic autonomy through negotiation, policy adjustment, and external balancing. Through a comparative analysis of four representative cases—Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos—this study identifies four distinct response mechanisms: Strategic Adaptation, Proactive Bargaining, Complex Hedging, and Opportunistic Wait‐and‐See. The variation in these policy responses is explained by the interaction of three key factors: the intensity of external economic pressure, domestic bargaining capacity, and patterns of strategic dependence. The findings demonstrate that the diplomatic behavior of ASEAN countries reflects broader strategies employed by small and middle powers in responding to economic coercion by major powers. Given ASEAN states' diverse strategic relationships with China, the reciprocal tariff policy has also intensified the dilemma of strategic alignment, increasing the risks associated with choosing between competing major powers.