Note on Extractability of the PST Polynomial Commitment Scheme

A recent work by Belohorec et al. (Crypto, 2025) shows that the well-known PST multivariate polynomial commitment scheme is black-box extractable under falsifiable assumptions. They show that a minimally modified (extended) PST is extractable under an assumption ARSDH( n ), and that the canonical PST is extractable under an assumption GARSDH( n ). Both of these assumptions are new and more specialized than the original ARSDH assumption proposed by Lipmaa et al. (Eurocrypt, 2024) to prove black-box extractability of the univariate KZG polynomial commitment. A natural question is whether these assumptions are actually stronger than the original ARSDH assumption. We answer this negatively: we show that both ARSDH( n ) and GARSDH( n ) are equivalent to the original ARSDH assumption. Secondly, we point out a gap in the proof that canonical PST is extractable under GARSDH( n ) assumption.

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Publication Details

Journal
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Published
2026-10-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.62056/avzogy10k
Primary Topic
Cryptography and Data Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Note on Extractability of the PST Polynomial Commitment Scheme

Janno Siim, Pritam Pal
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Cryptography and Data Security
article

Note on Extractability of the PST Polynomial Commitment Scheme

Janno Siim, Pritam Pal
article en

Abstract

A recent work by Belohorec et al. (Crypto, 2025) shows that the well-known PST multivariate polynomial commitment scheme is black-box extractable under falsifiable assumptions. They show that a minimally modified (extended) PST is extractable under an assumption ARSDH( n ), and that the canonical PST is extractable under an assumption GARSDH( n ). Both of these assumptions are new and more specialized than the original ARSDH assumption proposed by Lipmaa et al. (Eurocrypt, 2024) to prove black-box extractability of the univariate KZG polynomial commitment. A natural question is whether these assumptions are actually stronger than the original ARSDH assumption. We answer this negatively: we show that both ARSDH( n ) and GARSDH( n ) are equivalent to the original ARSDH assumption. Secondly, we point out a gap in the proof that canonical PST is extractable under GARSDH( n ) assumption.

IACR Communications in CryptologyVol. 3(3)
University of Tartu (EE)
European Commission, Eesti Teadusagentuur
Openalex Percentile: Top 13%
Cryptography and Data Security
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Note on Extractability of the PST Polynomial Commitment Scheme — Janno Siim, Pritam Pal · IACR Communications in Cryptology (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS