Failures of contingent reasoning in screening decisions

Abstract Screening decisions—choosing a costly action that reveals information about an unknown quality—can be crucial in various situations, such as hiring workers or designing policies. Choosing whether to screen can be difficult because it requires recognizing and trading off the benefits of information with the costs of getting it. We investigate whether people recognize when the benefits of screening dominate its costs and what causes them to choose otherwise. Our online experiment simulates a hiring scenario with an initial trial task. Participants can first reveal candidates’ quality at a small cost and then choose which candidate to hire. Most participants choose the dominated task that does not reveal the candidates’ quality, and this mistake persists even with experience and feedback. We show that this insufficient screening is driven by failures to anticipate inference and plan the full strategy.

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Publication Details

Journal
Experimental Economics
Published
2026-10-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10067
Primary Topic
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Failures of contingent reasoning in screening decisions

Gonzalo R. Arrieta, Maxim Bakhtin
Experimental Economics
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
article

Failures of contingent reasoning in screening decisions

Gonzalo R. Arrieta, Maxim Bakhtin
article en

Abstract

Abstract Screening decisions—choosing a costly action that reveals information about an unknown quality—can be crucial in various situations, such as hiring workers or designing policies. Choosing whether to screen can be difficult because it requires recognizing and trading off the benefits of information with the costs of getting it. We investigate whether people recognize when the benefits of screening dominate its costs and what causes them to choose otherwise. Our online experiment simulates a hiring scenario with an initial trial task. Participants can first reveal candidates’ quality at a small cost and then choose which candidate to hire. Most participants choose the dominated task that does not reveal the candidates’ quality, and this mistake persists even with experience and feedback. We show that this insufficient screening is driven by failures to anticipate inference and plan the full strategy.

Experimental Economics
University of Zurich (CH), Analysis Group (United States) (US)
School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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