TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS

Transport Layer Security (TLS) allows clients to establish secure and private channels with servers. DECO (CCS'20) and follow-up works proposed protocols that enable proving the provenance of a TLS response, i.e., that a payload came from a particular server, without needing server-side modifications. Unfortunately, these works are limited to proving Boolean statements over the payload (e.g., age ≥ 18) and cannot combine payloads from multiple clients. We introduce TLShare, a framework that extracts authenticated data from a TLS connection and imports it into secure multiparty computation (MPC) or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), without requiring server-side changes or exposing client credentials. Unlike prior work, TLShare allows the payload itself, not just a predicate about it, to serve as private input to secure downstream computation. TLShare supports combining verifiable inputs across multiple clients and servers, enabling new applications such as privacy-preserving financial risk assessment and collaborative analytics. We design three protocols for TLShare: one for MPC using verifiable secret sharing, and two for FHE using interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, each ensuring input authenticity, integrity, and end-to-end privacy. We evaluate all three protocols of TLShare over both LAN and WAN settings, comparing their trade-offs and demonstrating their practicality.

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Publication Details

Journal
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Published
2026-10-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.62056/a3z11w9p
Primary Topic
Cryptography and Data Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS

Dimitris Mouris, Xiang Xie, Andrei Lapets, Miguel de Vega et al.
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Cryptography and Data Security
article

TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS

Dimitris Mouris, Xiang Xie, Andrei Lapets, Miguel de Vega, Manuel B. Santos
article en

Abstract

Transport Layer Security (TLS) allows clients to establish secure and private channels with servers. DECO (CCS'20) and follow-up works proposed protocols that enable proving the provenance of a TLS response, i.e., that a payload came from a particular server, without needing server-side modifications. Unfortunately, these works are limited to proving Boolean statements over the payload (e.g., age ≥ 18) and cannot combine payloads from multiple clients. We introduce TLShare, a framework that extracts authenticated data from a TLS connection and imports it into secure multiparty computation (MPC) or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), without requiring server-side changes or exposing client credentials. Unlike prior work, TLShare allows the payload itself, not just a predicate about it, to serve as private input to secure downstream computation. TLShare supports combining verifiable inputs across multiple clients and servers, enabling new applications such as privacy-preserving financial risk assessment and collaborative analytics. We design three protocols for TLShare: one for MPC using verifiable secret sharing, and two for FHE using interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, each ensuring input authenticity, integrity, and end-to-end privacy. We evaluate all three protocols of TLShare over both LAN and WAN settings, comparing their trade-offs and demonstrating their practicality.

IACR Communications in CryptologyVol. 3(3)
Snap (United States) (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 14%
Cryptography and Data Security
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TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS — Dimitris Mouris, Xiang Xie, et al. · IACR Communications in Cryptology (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS