TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS
Transport Layer Security (TLS) allows clients to establish secure and private channels with servers. DECO (CCS'20) and follow-up works proposed protocols that enable proving the provenance of a TLS response, i.e., that a payload came from a particular server, without needing server-side modifications. Unfortunately, these works are limited to proving Boolean statements over the payload (e.g., age ≥ 18) and cannot combine payloads from multiple clients. We introduce TLShare, a framework that extracts authenticated data from a TLS connection and imports it into secure multiparty computation (MPC) or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), without requiring server-side changes or exposing client credentials. Unlike prior work, TLShare allows the payload itself, not just a predicate about it, to serve as private input to secure downstream computation. TLShare supports combining verifiable inputs across multiple clients and servers, enabling new applications such as privacy-preserving financial risk assessment and collaborative analytics. We design three protocols for TLShare: one for MPC using verifiable secret sharing, and two for FHE using interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, each ensuring input authenticity, integrity, and end-to-end privacy. We evaluate all three protocols of TLShare over both LAN and WAN settings, comparing their trade-offs and demonstrating their practicality.
Authors
- Dimitris Mouris (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2601-203X)
- Xiang Xie (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5044-9576)
- Andrei Lapets (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1053-5394)
- Miguel de Vega
- Manuel B. Santos (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-8607)
Institutions
- Snap (United States) (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Published
- 2026-10-26
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.62056/a3z11w9p
- Primary Topic
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00