Rorty’s Conception of the Self: From the Essentialist Self to the Liberal Ironist

This study examines Richard Rorty's contribution to the development of a contemporary neopragmatist perspective of the self, transcending classical metaphysical conceptions rooted in essentialist, representationalist, and foundationalist tendencies. The research explores how Rorty utilizes Nietzsche's genealogy and John Dewey's pragmatism to formulate the concept of the "liberal ironist" subject. It highlights how the philosopher breaks with the essentialist conception of truth, reframing it instead as a deliberative human construct that sustains the practical realm of life. The study concludes that Rorty's originality lies in his overcoming of Nietzschean individualism through a methodological reconciliation between the private sphere of the self – characterized by autonomy and ironist self-creation – and the public sphere, which is grounded in solidarity and liberal hope. This reconciliation ultimately establishes a dynamic subject capable of achieving justice and minimizing cruelty in society.