Market Timing and Ownership Structure in SEOs

This paper examines whether ownership structure moderates the relationship between market-timing incentives and the likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Using a panel of Australian listed firms and logit specifications, market-timing incentives are proxied by market-to-book ratios and pre-issue abnormal returns, while ownership structure is measured by the largest shareholder’s stake and institutional ownership. The results show that the positive association between market-timing proxies and SEO likelihood is weaker when ownership is more concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. Institutional ownership, by contrast, does not exhibit a robust moderating effect. These findings suggest that concentrated ownership may reduce firms’ sensitivity to market-timing signals, contrary to the initial expectation that large shareholders have stronger incentives to exploit overvaluation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Higher School of Economics Economic Journal
Published
2026-10-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.17323/ej.2026.43522
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Market Timing and Ownership Structure in SEOs

Jonibek Isomiddinov
Higher School of Economics Economic Journal
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Market Timing and Ownership Structure in SEOs

Jonibek Isomiddinov
article en

Abstract

This paper examines whether ownership structure moderates the relationship between market-timing incentives and the likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Using a panel of Australian listed firms and logit specifications, market-timing incentives are proxied by market-to-book ratios and pre-issue abnormal returns, while ownership structure is measured by the largest shareholder’s stake and institutional ownership. The results show that the positive association between market-timing proxies and SEO likelihood is weaker when ownership is more concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. Institutional ownership, by contrast, does not exhibit a robust moderating effect. These findings suggest that concentrated ownership may reduce firms’ sensitivity to market-timing signals, contrary to the initial expectation that large shareholders have stronger incentives to exploit overvaluation.

Higher School of Economics Economic JournalVol. 30(3)
National Research University Higher School of Economics (RU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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