Capacity-First Philosophy of Psychology

Abstract This paper aims to show that a neo-Aristotelian version of capacity-first philosophy of mind is fruitfully applied to a question which is specific to philosophy of psychology, namely: What counts as an adequate explanation in psychology? Drawing on Kenny, Glock and Schellenberg, the paper argues that the neo-Aristotelian capacity view is built around a set of criteria for the classification of capacities. All capacities are classified according to (1) possession-, (2) exercise-, (3) vehicle-, (4) opportunity-, (5) enablement- and (6) successful employment- criteria. These classification criteria are used to reconstruct the process of de-intellectualizing explanations of psychological phenomena. De-intellectualization targets theoretical assumptions about the circumstances in which the various criteria for classifying capacities are satisfied. The capacity approach offers a tool for regimenting the process of de-intellectualization. It also illustrates the contrast between de-intellectualization and Dennett’s homuncular functionalism. Rather than offering nothing more than conceptual clarity for debates about the metaphysics and epistemology of mind, the neo-Aristotelian capacity view explains why de-intellectualizing explanations is a feature of adequate explanations in psychology.