Dictator Game Variations and Their Influence on Transfers

Abstract The Experimental Dictator Game (DG) continues to spark the question why most dictators transfer nontrivial proportions of the money available to them. This exploratory study analyzes the effects of two innovative design variations on transfer rates and provides new evidence on transfer determination in the DG. First, recipients suggest allocations of funds before dictators make transfer decisions, allowing a comparison between recipient and computer suggestions. Second, follow-up requests allow dictators to increase initial transfer choices and/or to donate to a charity. The findings show that, on average, dictators’ transfers increase with the recipient’s suggestion up to the equal split and remain steady when demands exceed the equal split. Transfers were also higher when a computer suggested an allocation compared to the DG benchmark, challenging the idea that interpersonal communication alone leads to increasing transfer rates. Dictators increased transfers further when they received follow-up requests. In this case, average total transfer rates exceeded 50% of the initial endowment.