Motivated acquiescence: Believing what you want even when you know it’s irrational

Prevailing theories of wishful thinking describe a crucial limit on its powers: To believe what one wants, one must first convince oneself that it is rational to hold this belief. We suggest that this foundational assumption may be incorrect. The results of 13 experiments (ten preregistered; total N = 6,613) suggest that goals can bypass this bottleneck of subjective rationality, leading people to endorse wished-for beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging them to be irrational. We call this phenomenon motivated acquiescence. Motivated acquiescence can have harmful consequences: in a simulated plea-bargaining task, it produced negotiation impasses and was resistant to interventions that reliably promote agreement among non-acquiescers. These findings not only challenge a core assumption about wishful thinking, they have important implications for the efficacy of debiasing interventions that rely on appeals to rationality.

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Publication Details

Journal
PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/7ydtr
Primary Topic
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Type
preprint
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preprint

Motivated acquiescence: Believing what you want even when you know it’s irrational

David E. Melnikoff, Nina Strohminger
PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
preprint

Motivated acquiescence: Believing what you want even when you know it’s irrational

David E. Melnikoff, Nina Strohminger
preprint en

Abstract

Prevailing theories of wishful thinking describe a crucial limit on its powers: To believe what one wants, one must first convince oneself that it is rational to hold this belief. We suggest that this foundational assumption may be incorrect. The results of 13 experiments (ten preregistered; total N = 6,613) suggest that goals can bypass this bottleneck of subjective rationality, leading people to endorse wished-for beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging them to be irrational. We call this phenomenon motivated acquiescence. Motivated acquiescence can have harmful consequences: in a simulated plea-bargaining task, it produced negotiation impasses and was resistant to interventions that reliably promote agreement among non-acquiescers. These findings not only challenge a core assumption about wishful thinking, they have important implications for the efficacy of debiasing interventions that rely on appeals to rationality.

PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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