Motivated acquiescence: Believing what you want even when you know it’s irrational
Prevailing theories of wishful thinking describe a crucial limit on its powers: To believe what one wants, one must first convince oneself that it is rational to hold this belief. We suggest that this foundational assumption may be incorrect. The results of 13 experiments (ten preregistered; total N = 6,613) suggest that goals can bypass this bottleneck of subjective rationality, leading people to endorse wished-for beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging them to be irrational. We call this phenomenon motivated acquiescence. Motivated acquiescence can have harmful consequences: in a simulated plea-bargaining task, it produced negotiation impasses and was resistant to interventions that reliably promote agreement among non-acquiescers. These findings not only challenge a core assumption about wishful thinking, they have important implications for the efficacy of debiasing interventions that rely on appeals to rationality.
Authors
- David E. Melnikoff (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7090-9995)
- Nina Strohminger (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9239-6561)
Publication Details
- Journal
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/7ydtr
- Primary Topic
- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Type
- preprint