A countersignaling model of greenhushing: Demand, scrutiny, and verification in tourism markets

Why might a highly sustainable tourism firm say less about environmental performance than a moderately sustainable rival? We develop a countersignaling model in which tourists observe noisy evidence about operations, while public green claims attract scrutiny from stakeholders. Silence can be informative when favorable operational evidence helps tourists distinguish high-sustainability firms from low-sustainability firms, an unverified claim remains profitable only for moderately sustainable firms, and verified disclosure is too costly relative to its demand benefit. The model identifies a range in which scrutiny deters imitation without silencing those firms, and a comprehensive-verification threshold below which highly sustainable firms disclose rather than remain silent. It also shows how background attention to firms making no claim limits the result. Six source-audited tourism dossiers translate these conditions into observable decisions involving hotel communication, platform visibility, certification content, tourist response, and place-linked scrutiny, providing practical diagnostics for tourism firms, platforms, certifiers, regulators, and researchers.