Post-Quantum Oblivious Transfer for Oblivious Inference on Resource-Constrained Devices

Oblivious inference (OI) systems such as MiniONN, GAZELLE and DELPHI rely on oblivious transfer (OT) bootstrapped from base OTs whose security rests on CDH or DDH, which Shor’s algorithm breaks; for longlived IIoT deployments, Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later makes this a current concern. We review post-quantum (PQ) OT protocols published 2008–2026 against five axes: UC security, adversarial model, security model (ROM, QROM, CRS, standard model), round complexity, and reported benchmarks. Within our corpus, only lattice-based OT has measured performance on ARM application-class cores: ROTed reports 191 µs (286.5 k cycles) per ROT on a Cortex-A72, excluding network latency and randomness generation. Isogeny-based OT has the smallest messages but no reported implementation. We find two gaps: no implemented PQ base OT that UC-realises standard or random OT has a QROM proof, while the RO-free UC constructions are unimplemented; and no PQ base OT has been measured on microcontroller-class hardware.