Selecting an intra-profile dictator

Abstract Preferences are often best aggregated by adopting the preference of one individual, who is then called an “intra-profile dictator” since her preference is decisive under the present preference profile. This paper explores how to select intra-profile dictators. First, we demonstrate that under a continuity requirement, any intra-profile dictatorship extends to a full dictatorship when the preference space has more than one dimension. Consequently, we provide two possibility results that allow for discontinuity. The first is an aggregation rule that selects the greatest element according to a linear (and therefore discontinuous) ranking over the preference space. The second is a rule that selects an order statistic according to a linear (and therefore discontinuous) ordering over the preference space.

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Publication Details

Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Published
2026-10-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01683-5
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Selecting an intra-profile dictator

Takashi Hayashi
Social Choice and Welfare
Game Theory and Voting Systems
article

Selecting an intra-profile dictator

Takashi Hayashi
article en

Abstract

Abstract Preferences are often best aggregated by adopting the preference of one individual, who is then called an “intra-profile dictator” since her preference is decisive under the present preference profile. This paper explores how to select intra-profile dictators. First, we demonstrate that under a continuity requirement, any intra-profile dictatorship extends to a full dictatorship when the preference space has more than one dimension. Consequently, we provide two possibility results that allow for discontinuity. The first is an aggregation rule that selects the greatest element according to a linear (and therefore discontinuous) ranking over the preference space. The second is a rule that selects an order statistic according to a linear (and therefore discontinuous) ordering over the preference space.

Social Choice and Welfare
University of Glasgow (GB)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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