Technical Socialization in International Development Cooperation: Explaining Creative Compliance in Hungary’s Foreign Aid Policy

Abstract Theories of international socialization and Europeanization have frequently been used to explain changes in international development policies (IDPs) in aid donor countries. While this literature agrees that international pressure usually has only limited impact, there remains a lack of understanding around situations where states adopt certain, often only technical, international norms, but disregard other, more political ones. The paper uses the case of Hungary’s IDP, an unlikely candidate for international socialization. While the rhetoric and practice of Hungary’s IDP reflected the Orbán government’s nationalist-conservative ideology, the influence of the EU and the OECD DAC was also identifiable. After 2020, Hungary implemented many technical reforms to conform with recommendations from these bodies, including strengthening legislation, increasing transparency, and improving financial and tendering processes. These changes can be explained by cost-benefit analysis and ‘creative compliance’: Hungary hoped to gain financial benefits through greater access to EU funds, without compromising on government ideology.