Shared Intentions and Social Norms

A bstract What are social norms, and in what sense are they normative? An influential answer is that social norms are grounded in shared intentions. This view has now received a powerful articulation and defence by Michael Bratman. Bratman understands social norms in terms of shared policies, and he argues that the normativity of social rules is derived substantially from rational requirements applicable to plans. I argue that shared intentions of this kind cannot explain social norms. However the relevant intentions are construed, they cannot supply the deontic content of paradigmatic social rules. Moreover, I claim, the practices of criticising non-conformity and demanding conformity that characterise social norms are not explicable on the model of communicating requirements of rationality. I suggest that the attitude of acceptance, rather than intention, is a more promising candidate in a theory of social norms.

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Publication Details

Journal
Law and Philosophy
Published
2026-10-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-026-09589-0
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Shared Intentions and Social Norms

Hasan Dindjer
Law and Philosophy
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Shared Intentions and Social Norms

Hasan Dindjer
article en

Abstract

A bstract What are social norms, and in what sense are they normative? An influential answer is that social norms are grounded in shared intentions. This view has now received a powerful articulation and defence by Michael Bratman. Bratman understands social norms in terms of shared policies, and he argues that the normativity of social rules is derived substantially from rational requirements applicable to plans. I argue that shared intentions of this kind cannot explain social norms. However the relevant intentions are construed, they cannot supply the deontic content of paradigmatic social rules. Moreover, I claim, the practices of criticising non-conformity and demanding conformity that characterise social norms are not explicable on the model of communicating requirements of rationality. I suggest that the attitude of acceptance, rather than intention, is a more promising candidate in a theory of social norms.

Law and Philosophy
University of Oxford (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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