Counterinsurgency for Authoritarian Consolidation: Uganda, the LRA, and ISCAP

Much of the counterinsurgency literature tends to focus on cases involving Western powers. The literature on the counterinsurgency strategies of authoritarian states is on the other hand sparser. One still under-researched dynamic involves autocratic leaders leveraging counterinsurgency campaigns to consolidate power. This paper examines this phenomenon through a case study of Uganda under the presidency of Yoweri Museveni (1986-present), focusing on the counterinsurgencies against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which between 2018 and 2019 rebranded itself as Islamic State—Central Africa Province (ISCAP). Drawing on interviews, primary documents, and secondary sources, the paper demonstrates how Museveni’s regime exploited open-ended counterinsurgency campaigns to stifle opponents, garner domestic and international support, and entrench its grip on power. Additionally, the paper highlights how external actors such as the United States and even international organizations can inadvertently bolster such strategies, thereby facilitating processes of authoritarian consolidation.