Digital Ruble and Monetary Policy Transmission: A DSGE Analysis of Russia’s CBDC Implementation

This study developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze the macroeconomic implications of Russia’s digital ruble implementation within the context of financial sanctions and monetary policy autonomy. Using a New Keynesian framework augmented with a monopolistically competitive banking sector and central bank digital currency (CBDC) features, we examine the transmission mechanisms through which the digital ruble affects monetary policy effectiveness, financial intermediation and economic welfare. The Bank of Russia has unequivocally stated its intention to issue the digital ruble without interest remuneration. Accordingly, this paper treats the zero-remuneration scenario as the institutional baseline and frames the derivation of an optimal remuneration policy explicitly as a normative counterfactual, quantifying the welfare cost of the non-interest-bearing design. Calibration of the model to Russian economic data shows that introducing a non-remunerated digital ruble would lead to a 0.18% increase in steady-state consumption, whereas an optimally remunerated alternative could deliver a 0.79% increase. The model demonstrates that under sanctions-induced financial fragmentation, CBDC adoption partly restores monetary policy transmission by providing an alternative settlement infrastructure, with the mitigation effect reaching approximately 30% of sanctions-induced welfare losses under high-intensity scenarios. The analysis contributes to understanding CBDC implementation in emerging markets facing external financial constraints and provides quantitative guidance for welfare-optimal CBDC design parameters.