Some Objections to Phenomenal Conservatism about Inferential Justification

Abstract Proponents of phenomenal conservatism appeal to one’s experiences – in particular, to one’s seemings or appearances – to account for non-inferential justification. Some extend this approach to the inferential case. On Michael Huemer’s view, inferential seemings yield inferential justification: if it seems that the conclusion of an inference is true in light of the premisses being true, then – provided our belief in the premisses is justified – we gain some justification for believing the conclusion. I develop two Ramsey-inspired objections to this view. First, inferential seemings are too coarse-grained to account for differences in degree of justification. Second, inferences with the same degree of justification can be accompanied by very different intensities of seeming, and Huemer’s view implausibly rules out justified overconfidence. Both objections resist a potential type of response Huemer might offer to an objection from Smithies (2019).