When More Whistleblowing Increases Wrongdoing: An Agent‐Based Model of Whistleblowing Effectiveness, Feedback and Organisational Wrongdoing Dynamics

ABSTRACT Whistleblowing is widely promoted as an internal control mechanism for reducing organisational wrongdoing. However, its effects unfold within complex adaptive systems in which actors update behaviour in response to prior reporting outcomes. This study develops an agent‐based model of whistleblowing grounded in Dozier and Miceli's prosocial decision framework and integrates expectancy and reinforcement mechanisms linking organisational response to future reporting and wrongdoing. Simulation experiments show that whistleblowing effectiveness functions as the main control parameter in the system. When organisational responses are consistently effective, wrongdoing declines and reporting propensity strengthens even at modest reporting levels. When responses are ineffective, however, increasing vigilance or reporting conditions can accelerate wrongdoing by generating repeated failed interventions that discourage future reporting and reinforce misconduct. The findings show that whistleblowing is not merely a reporting event but a dynamic governance process shaped by feedback, adaptation and response credibility. The study demonstrates how agent‐based modelling can reveal path dependence, asymmetric convergence and counterintuitive system‐level outcomes beyond static theoretical explanations.