From Institutions to Cognitive Consensus: The Inner Foundation of Global Governance Dilemmas

Global governance has witnessed ever denser institutional supply, yet institutional idling, selective compliance, and governance deficits have not been alleviated. Situated within the dual perspective of institutionalism and constructivist International Relations theory, this paper argues that institutions constitute the external structure of community building, whereas cognitive consensus constitutes its inner foundation. Cognitive consensus refers to a stable and sustainable system of judgments formed by states, civilizations, groups, and individuals, while acknowledging their differences, on the basis of rational analysis and reflective judgment, regarding humanity's shared situation, transnational risks, overall interests, and collective responsibilities. It is distinct from value consensus, ideological identification, cultural identity, epistemic communities, and norm internalization, and can be operationalized along four dimensions: shared perception of common risks, perception of interlinked interests, willingness to assume responsibility, and stability of compliance with institutions. The paper elaborates the two-way cycle in which cognition leads institutional innovation and institutions consolidate cognitive internalization, analyzes three deep causes of failed institutional consensus (power asymmetry, incentive distortion, and cognitive fragmentation), and establishes its theoretical foundations in dialogue with rational-choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism as well as constructivist IR theory. By advancing the study of global governance from institutional design to cognitive generation, the paper offers a new analytical framework for understanding the micro-conditions of effective institutional operation.