Violence and capital accumulation in Colombia: the dominant social bloc of the 2000s

This article addresses a puzzle in analysing Colombia’s political economy: the coexistence of macroeconomic stability with persistent armed conflict, illicit economies and high levels of inequality. Drawing on the concept of the Dominant Social Bloc (DSB) developed by Bruno Amable and Stefano Palombarini, it argues that violence and illicit economies were not external to Colombia’s accumulation regime during the 2000s but were incorporated into the coalition that sustained it. By adapting the DSB framework to Colombia, the article incorporates economic dependency, armed conflict, and drug trafficking into the analysis. Based on qualitative evidence from public discourse and political positioning, the article identifies a DSB comprising domestic and foreign capital, landowners, narco-paramilitary actors, and segments of subaltern groups. It shows how a political strategy centred on security and foreign investment aligned the expectations of these actors and secured their political support, articulating economic, coercive, territorial, and symbolic power into a relatively stable coalition. More broadly, the article contributes to political economy debates by showing how violence and crime can become embedded within the coalitions that sustain accumulation regimes.