Killing #MahsaAmini on Persian Twitter: the repertoire of false information in authoritarian regimes

Despite the growth of research on false information (FI), most work, which is largely based on Western democracies, still relies on coarse dis/misinformation binaries and prioritizes automation and coordination (e.g. bot activity). This emphasis is limiting for authoritarian contexts, where verification is structurally constrained, and FI often operates through more nuanced, context-dependent practices. Focusing on Iran's Women, Life, Freedom (WLF) movement, this study examines the repertoire and user ecology of FI on Persian Twitter during contentious politics. Drawing on critical discourse analysis, we manually analyzed 36,255 popular tweets from 4,807 users posted during the first two months of movement (September 15, 2022–March 30, 2023). Findings show a significant shift from blatant fabrications toward FI accusations and unverified information (UI), generating credibility warfare and weaponized unverifiability. We argue that authoritarian FI is structured by unverifiability as much as falsity, which cannot be captured through text-only computational detection. The user ecology of FI is camp-specific, while inauthentic coordinated behaviour is limited. We theorize authoritarian FI as a repertoire shaped by verification constraints and credibility struggles, with implications for comparative research.