Personhood and personalism: Perspectives on the metaphysics of the person for the Digital Age

This article examines the ontological and ethical transformations of human subjectivity under the impact of expanding digital technologies. Structurally, it is divided into two thematic parts. The first explores the development of personalist philosophy by establishing its historical foundations through key milestones in Western thought. It traces the genealogy of the person, charting its evolution from the ancient Greek theatrical mask and the Roman institutionalization of identity to the moral philosophy of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Moving onward, it then follows this trajectory through patristic theological redefinitions, Boethius’s formulation of the person as a rational substance, Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy, which endows it with the highest dignity, and Max Scheler’s phenomenological analysis of affectivity, concluding with the post-war decline in the value of human personhood. The second part turns to identity in the virtual space, examining algorithmic determinism and technologies capable of behaviourally simulating specific persons, whether living or deceased. It addresses the dangerous depersonalization of the digital realm and argues that the rise of automated non-human agents could prove the “Dead Internet Theory” a reality by creating an environment devoid of authentic human presence. Ultimately, the study considers the future of personhood in the age of algorithms, arguing that while technology can reproduce personality with ever greater fidelity, it cannot reproduce the person. And it is precisely this distinction that constitutes the final—and most important—refuge of personalism.