Contractual Absolution: A Legal-Economic Framework Restricting Extra-Contractual Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in State-Subsidized Enterprises

Contemporary political economy frequently imposes open-ended Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) demands on private firms that receive state subsidies, public grants, or regulatory concessions. This paper establishes the legal-economic doctrine of Contractual Absolution. We argue that when a private enterprise enters into a bilateral subsidy agreement with the state and fulfills its explicitly stipulated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)—such as job creation targets, capital expenditure quotas, or technological benchmarks—its legal and moral obligations to the state are fully discharged. Imposing extra-contractual social expectations post hoc violates administrative principles of non-arbitrariness, increases regulatory risk, and enables state institutions to shift public policy failures onto private balance sheets. By integrating Transaction Cost Economics and the Administrative Principle of Prohibition of Improper Coupling, this framework establishes that strict contractual performance grants complete immunity from extralegal moral demands, reclaiming transaction realism in state-firm governance.