Public libraries in Vietnam: Authority-resource decoupling and the funding gap in national policy

Vietnam's public library standards bind every level of local government equally, yet provision remains uneven. This article examines that paradox through the separation of standard-setting authority from funding authority, formalised as the binding fiscal bridge (B): whether an instrument attaches to a standard an expenditure obligation on the budget holder, fixed by a rate, ratio or minimum. A provision-level analysis of 39 instruments (2000 to 2026) finds B absent from every classifiable instrument, with none in force barring a zero allocation; whether one occurs is predicted to depend on the implementing unit's direct budget status. Twenty-one interviews are consistent with this configuration. Three plausibility probes do not isolate B as the cause of funding variation. A funding-guarantee framework was removed as standards were tightened, an asymmetry apparently underexamined in policy-dismantling research. Collection development, digital services and commune-level reading are left without verifiably guaranteed recurrent funding. The proposition is tentative.