Who calls the shots? Theorising the political behaviour of trade associations

Abstract While there is perennial concern about the role of business in policy and politics, the trade associations (TAs) that represent industry in policy contests remain undertheorised. This article introduces a theory of TA position-taking that explains who calls the shots over TA policy positions when their member firms are divided. We identify three camps within TAs that can shape their policy positions: the largest members, the broader membership and professional staff. The relative influence of each camp depends on several conditioning factors: TA decision-making governance, resource differentials between camps, and the organizational preservation imperative. Our theory suggests that, while large members often call the shots over TA policy positions, they can also be willing to compromise in order to preserve the political effectiveness of their association. We illustrate our theory drawing on rare interviews with executives from oil and gas trade associations and a detailed historical analysis of the American Petroleum Institute’s policy positions. Our contribution not only represents a step towards developing a broader theory of TA political behaviour, it also contributes to enduring debates about the nature of business bias and the mechanisms underpinning business unity on policy issues.