Making corporate data accessible for public-interest research: A consent-based access mechanism

While privacy regulations such as the GDPR, HIPAA, and CCPA are vital for safeguarding individual rights, the interaction of legal uncertainty, corporate risk management, and restrictive data-sharing practices can, in practice, constrain public-interest research more severely than some commercial uses of data. Academic researchers, operating under strict ethical oversight, non-commercial mandates, and long-standing traditions of responsible data stewardship, can nevertheless face substantial barriers to granular data needed for addressing urgent societal challenges. Unlike tech companies, researchers lack the infrastructure to collect large-scale data passively through consumer-facing platforms; there is no app or service from which research data naturally flows as a byproduct of user interaction. Meanwhile, private technology firms often retain greater practical capacity to collect, analyze, and monetize sensitive user data within their own data infrastructures. This paper argues for a targeted regulatory reform: the introduction of an Institutional Research Use Only consent mechanism that would allow appropriately safeguarded data sharing between tech companies and accredited academic institutions under strict governance. Such a mechanism would resolve the asymmetry between ethical intent and regulatory burden, empowering public-good science without compromising user privacy.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Big Data & Society
Published
2026-10-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517261490278
Primary Topic
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Making corporate data accessible for public-interest research: A consent-based access mechanism

Milad S. Malekzadeh
Big Data & Society
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
article

Making corporate data accessible for public-interest research: A consent-based access mechanism

Milad S. Malekzadeh
article en

Abstract

While privacy regulations such as the GDPR, HIPAA, and CCPA are vital for safeguarding individual rights, the interaction of legal uncertainty, corporate risk management, and restrictive data-sharing practices can, in practice, constrain public-interest research more severely than some commercial uses of data. Academic researchers, operating under strict ethical oversight, non-commercial mandates, and long-standing traditions of responsible data stewardship, can nevertheless face substantial barriers to granular data needed for addressing urgent societal challenges. Unlike tech companies, researchers lack the infrastructure to collect large-scale data passively through consumer-facing platforms; there is no app or service from which research data naturally flows as a byproduct of user interaction. Meanwhile, private technology firms often retain greater practical capacity to collect, analyze, and monetize sensitive user data within their own data infrastructures. This paper argues for a targeted regulatory reform: the introduction of an Institutional Research Use Only consent mechanism that would allow appropriately safeguarded data sharing between tech companies and accredited academic institutions under strict governance. Such a mechanism would resolve the asymmetry between ethical intent and regulatory burden, empowering public-good science without compromising user privacy.

Big Data & SocietyVol. 13(4)
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
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