Individualität als autochthoner Zustand des Menschen. Kritik am libertären Modell

Abstract This article examines the libertarian conception of the human being as an originally autonomous individual through a genealogical reading of Friedrich Nietzsche. It argues that the libertarian assumption of an “autochthonous” state of individuality – according to which the individual precedes and stands above social organization – rests on a reductive anthropological model. Drawing on Nietzsche’s early critique of the liberal state and his reflections on the social formation of drives and consciousness, the paper shows that individuality emerges from historically and socially shaped normative structures rather than preceding them. The analysis is further illustrated by contemporary libertarian discourse, exemplified by statements of Argentine President Javier Milei. Finally, Judith Butler’s analysis of vulnerability and interdependence is introduced to highlight the constitutive social conditions of subject formation. The article thus challenges libertarian individualism by reconstructing a genealogical account of the social constitution of individuality.