Tripartite evolutionary game and dynamic governance of cloud energy storage innovation ecosystems under technological trust shocks

Opportunistic service performance deviations and insufficient technology-enabled transaction assurance may impede sustainable collaboration on emerging cloud energy storage (CES) platforms. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game among local governments, CES operators, and manufacturing enterprises, and models technological trust as an exogenous transaction-assurance state that affects collaborative benefit realization and regulatory verification costs. Based on Jacobian local stability analysis, nonlinear analysis of non-vertex rest points, and numerical simulations, the results show that a low-trust, subsidy-supported configuration can generate persistent government–operator oscillations around a center-type rest point while enterprise participation remains high. Under high technological trust, the state is characterized by passive regulation, high-quality service, and CES leasing becomes locally asymptotically stable when the corresponding payoff inequalities are satisfied; however, sampled initial conditions reveal basin-dependent multistability rather than global convergence. Higher technological trust directly reduces active-regulation costs and increases the relative attractiveness of active regulation, while the subsequent decline in regulation arises indirectly through improved service quality. Controlled subsidy phase-out experiments further show that high technological trust can reduce dependence on continued fiscal support under specified leasing-incentive conditions. These findings support condition-dependent coordination of regulatory and fiscal instruments in CES governance.